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717 
SHOW ME THE GREEN: CIVIL RICO ACTIONS 
AGAINST EMPLOYERS WHO KNOWINGLY HIRE 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of federal laws restricting immigration into the United 
States,1 Congressional policy has, with few exceptions,2 focused on 
restricting the influx of foreign workers in order to protect the American 
workforce.3 Despite nearly a century and a half of experimentation with 
these laws, the perpetual problem of undocumented workers persists in 
large part because “[t]he prospect of better job opportunities in the United 
States . . . than in their native countries remains a powerful lure for many 
immigrants.”4 Notably, for over two decades, federal immigration law has 
expressly prohibited employers from hiring workers who lack proper 
documentation.5 However, inadequate enforcement of immigration laws 
has enabled the widespread hiring of undocumented workers in low-wage, 
labor-intensive sectors of the U.S. economy to continue.6 The “insatiable” 
 
 
 1. Prior to the late nineteenth century, immigration into the United States remained unrestricted. 
See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN 
THE AMERICAN POLITY 92 (1985). 
The Alien Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 570 (1798), had authorized the president to expel from the 
United States any alien that he deemed dangerous, but the law was severely criticized and 
expired in 1800. Occasional state efforts to restrict immigration during the first half of the 
nineteenth century were invalidated by the Supreme Court as intrusions on the federal power 
to regulate foreign commerce. E.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849); Chy Lung v. 
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875). In 1875, the first federal exclusion legislation was adopted; it 
barred convicts and prostitutes. 18 Stat. 477 (1875). 
Id. at 155 n.3. 
 2. Beginning in 1942, in response to the U.S. agricultural labor shortage caused by World War 
II, the United States entered into a bilateral agreement with Mexico to import cheap contract labor. 
Under the Bracero Program, spanning a period of twenty-two years, five million Mexican workers 
entered the United States as “braceros.” See KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO 
PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992), for a detailed analysis of the Bracero Program, 
including its relevance to the undocumented worker problem of today.  
 3. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 
(1984). See infra Part II.A. 
 4. Report: Undocumented Immigrant Population Surges, available at http://www.usatoday. 
com/news/washington/2005-03-21-undocumented-immigrants_x.htm (posted on Mar. 21, 2005) 
[hereinafter Report] (citing Pew Hispanic Center director Roberto Suro discussing the main reason 
frequently offered by other researchers to explain the “ongoing demand”). 
 5. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000). 
 6. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS (June 14, 2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf. 
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demand for low-cost labor,7 coupled with the economic incentives to 
obtain employment at wages higher than those typically available in 
lesser-developed countries of origin,8 are often cited as the main 
contributors to the ongoing problem of illegal immigration.9  
In economic terms, the hiring of undocumented workers produces 
financial gain for employers when it reduces labor costs.10 Given their 
precarious status under current U.S. law,11 undocumented workers are 
more willing to suffer exploitative work conditions12—which most often 
include rampant violations of the federal minimum wage and overtime pay 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)13—than their 
documented counterparts. As a result, employers in labor-intensive 
industries who consistently remain in noncompliance with federal 
immigration law are able to gain an unfair advantage over business 
competitors by keeping labor costs artificially low.14 Similarly, the routine 
 
 
 7. Jorge A. Vargas, Consular Protection to Illegal Migratory Workers and Mexican 
Undocumented Minors: Two Sensitive Issues Addressed by the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the 
United States-Mexico Binational Commission, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 157–58 (1996) 
(“[T]here is a need for cheap and permanent labor in the U.S. at certain times of the year and in 
specific areas of the economy . . . . This chronic and insatiable U.S. demand for cheap and unprotected 
labor serves as the most powerful magnet in attracting Mexican migratory workers . . . .”). 
 8. The difference in wages can be staggering. In 2004, for example, the median hourly wage in 
Mexico—which is the country of origin for most undocumented workers in the United States—was a 
mere $1.86 (21 pesos) compared to a $9.00 median hourly wage for Mexican-born workers in the 
United States. [The U.S. figure is not limited to only undocumented workers]. How the Influx is 
Changing the U.S., TIME, Feb. 6, 2006, at 38 (citing Pew Hispanic Center, National Immigration Law 
Center, National Conference of State Legislatures, and INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estad.stica, 
Geograf.a e Inform.tica)).  
 9. Id.; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the 
Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371, 379 (1998). 
 11. One of the grounds for which a noncitizen may be ordered removed is being present in the 
United States without being admitted. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) (2000); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 
(2000).  
 12. See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for 
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179 (1994).  
 13. Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2000) (establishing that 
certain employers must pay employees not less than $5.15 an hour and requiring that employers pay 
employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours 
worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek). 
 The FLSA may be enforced in any of three ways: (1) through civil actions brought by the 
Secretary of Labor on behalf of aggrieved employees to recover unpaid minimum wages, overtime 
compensation, and an equal amount in liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (2000). Additionally, 
the Secretary of Labor has the authority to pursue civil penalties of up to $1,000 per violation for 
repeated or willful violations. Id. § 216(e); (2) through civil actions brought by the aggrieved 
employee. Id. § 216(b); or (3) through criminal actions brought by the Department of Justice. Id. 
§ 216(a). See also Steven Greenhouse, Among Janitors, Labor Violations Go With the Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2005, at A1.  
 14. By paying undocumented workers less than the federal minimum wage, employers 
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hiring of undocumented workers in low-wage sectors has been accused of 
depressing the wages of fellow employees who are legally authorized to be 
employed in the United States (legally authorized workers), including both 
citizens and noncitizens alike.15 An emergent line of cases, based on a 
private cause of action against employers who illegally hire undocumented 
workers, attempts to remedy the foregoing injuries and indicates the 
potential for improved employer compliance with federal law.  
This Note examines the potential for increased privatization in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law through civil suits brought under 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).16 Part II 
provides a brief overview of federal law governing undocumented workers 
and examines the emergent line of civil RICO cases, predicated on 
immigration offenses. Part III analyzes the elements of civil RICO’s 
statutory standing provision, and this Note determines that under particular 
factual circumstances, undocumented workers would satisfy proximate 
standard causation compelled by the Supreme Court. Part IV argues that 
granting undocumented workers standing to sue under civil RICO will 
further the legislative policy of preserving jobs for American workers. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Employment-Based Immigration Law 
1. Labor Exclusion Grounds 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, when Congress enacted 
federal laws restricting entry into the United States, contract labor became 
one of the first categorical grounds for exclusion. During this era, 
organized labor lobbied vigorously for legislation to protect American 
workers.17 As a result, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882 to protect domestic labor from competition from foreign workers for 
jobs.18 Three years later in 1885, Congress enacted the Alien Contract 
 
 
artificially reduce their costs giving them an advantage over business competitors who pay their 
workers the prevailing market wage or at least the statutory minimum wage. 
 15. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976) (recognizing that the “acceptance by 
illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress 
wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens”); see also infra Part II.D.2. 
 16. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000). 
 17. See BRIGGS, supra note 3, at 27. 
 18. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943). The law barred the 
entry of Chinese immigrants for ten years and was extended at ten-year intervals. See BRIGGS, supra 
note 3, at 27. 
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Laws, which prohibited the importation of foreign contract labor.19 Its 
purpose was to protect domestic labor “by curtailing the practice of 
employers importing large numbers of foreign workers in order to force 
domestic workers to work at reduced wages.”20 
2. Labor Certification 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),21 restructured and 
codified immigration law. The INA replaced the previous contract labor 
provision with a labor certification requirement.22 Under the INA, for 
certain employment-based immigration, the law requires the granting of 
labor certification by the Secretary of Labor certifying that there is a lack 
of available workers,23 and that “the employment of such alien will not 
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the 
United States similarly employed.”24 The INA evinced a continuing 
legislative intent to protect domestic labor.25 
3. Immigration Reform  
In 1986, after years of “heated congressional and public debate,”26 
Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),27 
which added section 274A to the INA.28 With IRCA, Congress focused 
primarily on decreasing the employment opportunities for undocumented 
workers in the United States,29 anticipating a subsequent reduction in 
illegal immigration.30 For the first time, IRCA made it illegal for an 
 
 
 19. Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332. See Briggs, supra note 3, at 27.  
 20. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF ALIENS 
UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 8 (Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter GROUNDS FOR 
EXCLUSION]. 
 21. INA, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1524 
(2000)). 
 22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i) (2000). 
 23. Id. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(I). 
 24. Id. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i)(II). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 1365, at 50–51 (1952) (discussing INA’s “safeguards for American labor”). 
 26. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented 
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 956 (1988). 
 27. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 28. IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360–63 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a-b 
(2000)). 
 29. IRCA also created a large amnesty program in a companion attempt to reduce the number of 
undocumented residents. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(a) (1988).  
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, at 45–62 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660 (“[A]s 
long as job opportunities are available to undocumented aliens, the intense pressure to surreptitiously 
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employer to hire an undocumented worker.31 Under section 274A, an 
employer who knowingly hires or continues to employ undocumented 
workers is liable for civil fines32 and also may face criminal prosecution.33 
The Supreme Court has noted that IRCA “forcefully” made combating the 
employment of undocumented workers central to the “policy of 
immigration law.”34 Congress gave contour to its cornerstone policy of 
reducing employment opportunities for undocumented workers by 
introducing an “employment verification system,”35 which denies 
employment to a noncitizen who (a) is not lawfully present in the United 
States or (b) is not lawfully authorized to work in the United States.36 
Under the “IRCA regime,”37 it is likewise illegal for workers to submit 
fraudulent documents to employers for the purpose of verifying their 
authorization to work in the United States.38  
A decade later, in 1996, Congress strengthened IRCA’s cornerstone 
policy by enacting section 203 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which amended section 274 of 
the INA.39 The hiring offense of section 274 makes it a criminal offense 
 
 
enter this country or to violate status once admitted as a nonimmigrant in order to obtain employment 
will continue.”).  
 31. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(i)(A) (2000). Under INA § 274A(a)(1)(A), “[i]t is unlawful for a person 
or other entity—to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien 
knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.” See also Bosniak, supra note 26, at 979. 
[U]ntil the implementation of employer sanctions, immigration law directly regulated border 
and entry only; the ‘private’ relationships that the undocumented person might form with any 
other social member once she has entered the country were not the object of exclusionary 
regulation. Indeed, the undocumented alien was usually permitted to avail herself of the 
courts in order to enforce her bargains. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 (1984) (reasoning that 
Congress had not “made it a separate criminal offense” for employers to hire an undocumented 
worker, or for an undocumented worker “to accept employment after entering this country illegally,” 
and therefore finding “no reason to conclude that application of the [National Labor Relations Act] to 
employment practices affecting such [undocumented workers] would necessarily conflict with the 
[then-existing] terms of the INA.”). 
 32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (2000). 
 33. Id. § 1324a(f)(1). 
 34. INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991). “We have often 
recognized that a ‘primary purpose in restricting immigration is to preserve jobs for American 
workers.’” Id. at 194 (quoting Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893). 
 35. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (2000). 
 36. Id. § 1324a(h)(3). 
 37. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148 (2002). 
 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(1)-(3) (2000). Noncitizens are prohibited from using “any forged, 
counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document” or “any document lawfully issued to or with respect to 
a person other than the possessor” in order to obtain employment. Violators are subject to civil and 
criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(b) (2000).  
 39. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000)). 
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for an employer to knowingly hire within any twelve-month period at least 
ten undocumented workers who have been brought into the United States 
in violation of section 274.40 
However, Congress’s attempts to effectuate broad immigration policy 
reform by targeting employers have fallen markedly short of achieving 
either any reduction in the hiring of undocumented workers,41 or any 
corresponding decrease in illegal immigration.42 Although a precise figure 
of undocumented residents in the United States is virtually impossible to 
ascertain, a report released in March 2005 speculated that the total 
undocumented population had reached nearly eleven million,43 compared 
to an estimated three to five million undocumented residents prior to the 
enactment of IRCA.44 In addition, the report revealed an estimated annual 
increase of approximately 500,000 undocumented residents in the United 
States during recent years.45 Furthermore, after IRCA made the act of 
knowingly employing undocumented workers a punishable offense, 
employers in sectors typically accused of employing undocumented 
workers designated workers as “independent subcontractors” to perform 
work that previously had been performed by “employees.”46 Some 
 
 
 40. The hiring offense of Section 274 criminalizes:  
(3)(A) Any person who, during any 12-month period, knowingly hires for employment at 
least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals are aliens described in 
subparagraph (B) . . . (B) An alien described in this subparagraph is an alien who—(i) is an 
unauthorized alien (as defined in section 274A(h)(3), and (ii) has been brought into the 
United States in violation of this subsection. 
INA Section 274(a)(3)(A)-(B) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A)-(B) (2000). 
 41. Maria Echaveste, Keynote Address at the Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human 
Rights and Justice Inaugural Conference: Working Borders: Linking Debates About Insourcing and 
Outsourcing of Capital and Labor (Feb. 10–11, 2005), in 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 691, 705 (2005) (arguing 
that employer sanctions under IRCA fail due to the United States’s inadequate system of fines and 
comparing the minimal fines levied in the few cases that have been brought against U.S. employers for 
hiring undocumented workers with European countries where employers are sanctioned tens of 
thousands of dollars for each undocumented worker).  
 42. See Report, supra note 4. 
 43. See Report, supra note 4.  
 44. Bosniak, supra note 26, at 960 n.14 (citing Jeffrey Passel, Estimating the Number of 
Undocumented Aliens, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: MONTHLY LAB. REV., Sept. 1986, at 33). 
 45. See Report, supra note 4. The illegal immigrant population has had “a net increase of roughly 
485,000 per year between 2000 and 2004.”  
 46. See Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 0100515, 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002), for 
an example of a suit involving a cleaning services company that contracted with four grocery store 
chains to provide nighttime janitorial services and designated the janitors (mostly undocumented 
workers) as “independent contractors.” See also Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lee W. Jackson, Union Survival 
Strategies for the Twenty-first Century, 12 LAB. LAW. 165, 177 (1996):  
For example, by taking money from taxicab drivers rather than giving money to them, taxicab 
companies have succeeded in virtually eliminating employees from the taxicab industry and 
transforming almost all cab drivers into independent contractors. The trucking industry has 
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employers also began associating with labor subcontractors, intending to 
circumvent federal immigration law while providing insulation from 
potential liability.47 
B. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB and its Aftermath 
In a landmark case decided in 2002, the Supreme Court in Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB48 refused to enforce the National Labor 
Relations Board’s (NLRB) award of backpay to an undocumented worker 
who was terminated for supporting a workplace campaign to organize a 
union.49 During his testimony at an administrative hearing to determine the 
amount of backpay owed under the NLRB’s ruling,50 Jose Castro revealed 
that “he was born in Mexico and that he had never been legally admitted 
to, or authorized to work in, the United States.”51 Castro admitted that he 
had obtained his job at the Hoffman plant by fraudulently submitting legal 
documents belonging to a natural-born U.S. citizen.52 The Supreme Court 
held that federal immigration policy, as expressed by IRCA, prohibited the 
award of “backpay to an [undocumented worker] for years of work not 
performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a 
job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud.”53 
 
 
followed a similar course. This trend has gone so far that one Seattle cleaning contractor, after 
submitting the lowest bid to clean downtown office buildings, proceeded to sell ‘franchises’ 
for the right to clean floors of downtown office buildings for $4,000 to $7,000 a floor—
transforming low-wage janitors, mostly immigrants from Central America and Asia, into 
‘independent contractors.’ 
 47. However, courts have been willing to allow workers to sue employers under a “joint 
employer doctrine,” if an employment relationship is found to exist, by applying a multi-factor 
“economic realities” test. See, e.g., Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a 
Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291 (2003).  
 48. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 49. Id. at 151 n.1. The NLRA prohibits “discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor 
organization . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). 
 50. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 141. In December 1988, a union-organizing campaign began at 
the Hoffman Plastic production plant where Castro worked. In January 1989, Hoffman Plastic laid off 
Castro and three other employees for supporting the organizing activities. In January 1992, the NLRB 
found that Hoffman Plastic had unlawfully terminated the employees in violation of the NLRA. In 
June 1993, the compliance hearing before an Administrative Law Judge was held to determine the 
amount of backpay owed to each of the four employees. Castro revealed his undocumented status at 
that hearing. Id. at 140–41. 
 51. Id. at 141; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2000) (defining unauthorized alien). 
 52. Hoffman Plastic, 535 U.S. at 141. 
 53. Id. at 149.  
[I]t is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States 
without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the 
undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision, multiple 
persuasive sources of legal authority have agreed that the narrow holding 
in Hoffman Plastic does not preclude undocumented workers from 
recovering wages owed under the FLSA54 for work already performed. 
Lower federal courts have continued to hold that undocumented workers 
remain equally entitled to protection under the minimum wage and 
overtime pay provisions of the FLSA. These courts have recognized a vital 
distinction between precluding undocumented workers from recovering 
backpay for work that would have been performed and allowing 
undocumented workers to recover wages owed for work actually 
performed.55 Moreover, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), the agency 
charged with administering the FLSA, has stated that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s decision [in Hoffman Plastic] does not mean that undocumented 
workers do not have rights under other U.S. labor laws,”56 and that the 
DOL “will continue to enforce the FLSA . . . without regard to whether an 
employee is documented or undocumented.”57 Further, at the request of 
the Mexican government shortly after the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Hoffman Plastic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued an 
unanimous advisory opinion ruling that international principles of 
nondiscrimination and equal protection prohibited discriminating against 
undocumented workers with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment.58 Although the court recognized the sovereign right of 
 
 
IRCA’s enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in 
direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations.  
Id. at 148. 
 54. FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206–207 (2000).  
 55. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that an 
undocumented janitor who had continued working after his visa expired was entitled to sue employer 
for backpay for work performed); Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(denying employer’s request to discover plaintiffs’ immigration status); Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. 
0100515, 2002 WL 1163623 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (denying discovery of plaintiffs’ immigration 
status, noting that “the protections of the FLSA are available to citizens and undocumented workers 
alike”); cf. Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (expressing doubt that 
Hoffman Plastic precludes awarding backpay to undocumented workers under any federal statute); Del 
Ray Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1122 n.7 (7th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing undocumented 
workers seeking recovery for work already performed from work they would have performed). 
 56. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WAGE AND 
HOUR DIVISION, FACT SHEET #48: APPLICATION OF U.S. LABOR LAWS TO IMMIGRANT WORKERS: 
EFFECT OF HOFFMAN PLASTIC DECISION ON LAWS ENFORCED BY THE WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, 
available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/whd/whdfs48.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). 
See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (articulating 
principle of deference that courts should accord reasonable administrative agency interpretations of 
statutes). 
 57. FACT SHEET #48, supra note 56. 
 58. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, 
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p717 Lam book pages.doc 4/23/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] SHOW ME THE GREEN 725 
 
 
 
 
governments to deny employment to undocumented workers, it held that 
once an employment relationship is formed, undocumented workers are 
entitled to equal human rights protection in the workplace.59  
C. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), a broad civil and criminal statute, as part of the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970.60 Originally, RICO’s key purpose was to serve 
as a government tool for controlling organized crime, but since its 
inception, civil RICO has been liberally construed according to its express 
admonition, to provide private plaintiffs with a remedy against defendants 
whose activities extend far beyond conventional notions of “organized 
crime.”61  
To adequately state a RICO enterprise claim under section 1962(c), a 
plaintiff must plead: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern 
(4) of racketeering activity.”62 Section 1961(4) of RICO defines 
“enterprise” as including “any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”63 Satisfying the third 
 
 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seviea_ 
18_ing.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion OC-18/03]. The broad scope of 
the Inter-American Human Rights Court’s advisory jurisdiction is provided by Article 64 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights: “The member states of the Organization may consult the 
Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of 
human rights in the American states.” BUERGENTHAL ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A 
NUTSHELL 268 (3d ed. 2002). See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-
American Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1985).  
 59. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03. See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Legal Status and Rights of 
Undocumented Workers. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 in International Decisions (David D. Caron ed.), 
99 AMER. J. INT’L L. 460, 460 (2005) (“In other words, states may not further their immigration 
policies by denying basic workplace protections to undocumented employees.”).  
 60. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 942 
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)). Under section 1962(c), it is illegal “for any 
person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (legislative intent shows 
RICO’s breadth). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (recognizing 
that “in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original 
conception of its enactors”).  
 62. Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (internal citation omitted) (setting 
forth the RICO elements that apply to both civil and criminal claims). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2000). See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) 
(holding that “one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself [to be 
subject to liability under section 1962(c)]”); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981) (“The 
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element “requires at least two acts of racketeering activity.”64 Finally,  
“racketeering activity” is defined by an exhaustive list of predicate 
offenses for which the defendant may be indictable,65 regardless of 
whether a criminal conviction is actually obtained.66  
In addition to establishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing” necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction,67 plaintiffs may sue 
under civil RICO only if they also satisfy the statutory standing 
requirements set forth in section 1964(c),68 regardless of the merit of the 
claims. The civil RICO standing provision, granting a private cause of 
action, states that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by 
reason of a violation of section 1962 . . . may sue [to] . . . recover [treble 
damages] . . . .”69  
The Supreme Court in Holmes v. Securities Investor,70 interpreted the 
clause “by reason of” in section 1964(c) to require a RICO plaintiff to 
show that the defendant’s RICO violation was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury, as well as the “but for” cause.71 Because section 1964(c) 
was modeled directly after the federal antitrust provisions granting 
standing,72 Holmes therefore similarly construed section 1964(c).73 
 
 
enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common 
purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”).  
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000). “‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of 
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a 
prior act of racketeering activity.” 
 65. Id. § 1961(1)(A)–(F). See also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 481. 
 66. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488–89. 
 67. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that “the core 
component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III [of the Constitution]”). Constitutional standing consists of the following three elements:  
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before 
the court. Third, it must be likely, as to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision.  
Id. at 560–61 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496–97. 
 69. Id. The entire provision reads: “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of 
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district 
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” Id.  
 70. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).  
 71. Id. at 265–68. 
 72. The Clayton Act provides: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss3/5
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Holmes articulated the following three justifications underlying the 
“directness requirement:”74 
First, the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to 
ascertain the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the 
violation, as distinct from other, independent, factors. Second, quite 
apart from problems of proving factual causation, recognizing 
claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed 
at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the 
risk of multiple recoveries. And, finally, the need to grapple with 
these problems is simply unjustified by the general interest in 
deterring injurious conduct, since directly injured victims can 
generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys 
general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by 
plaintiffs injured more remotely.75 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.76 
under the Holmes analysis and instructed that “[w]hen a court evaluates a 
RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is 
 
 
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in the district in 
which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.  
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). See Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992) (citing 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529–30 (1983)). 
 73. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 533–36. Both the Clayton Act and the Sherman 
Act have been interpreted to incorporate common-law principles of proximate causation, and it must 
be assumed that when Congress enacted § 1964(c) it intended the words to have the same meaning that 
the courts had already given the antitrust statutes. Id.  
We may fairly credit the 91st Congress, which enacted RICO, with knowing the interpretation 
federal courts had given the words earlier Congresses had used first in § 7 of the Sherman 
Act, and later in the Clayton Act’s § 4. It used the same words, and we can only assume it 
intended them to have the same meaning that courts had already given them. Proximate cause 
is thus required.  
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (internal citation omitted). 
 74. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265–68. If only factual causation was required, a plaintiff would be able 
to recover by the mere “showing that the defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and the 
defendant’s violation was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Id. at 265–66. “This construction is 
hardly compelled, however, and the very unlikelihood that Congress meant to allow all factually 
injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us that RICO should not get such an expansive reading.” Id. at 
265. See also id. at 268–69 (citing 1 J.G. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 55–56 (1882)); Associated 
Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 
533 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go 
beyond the first step.”)). 
 75. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70. 
 76. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., No. 04-433, 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006). 
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whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”77 In 
Anza, Ideal, a steel supply company, brought a civil RICO suit against a 
business competitor, National, alleging that National violated section 
1962(c) by failing to charge customers state sales tax, which allowed 
National to gain a competitive advantage by lowering its prices.78 The 
RICO predicate offenses alleged were mail and wire fraud,79 and the 
injury claimed was Ideal’s loss of sales.80 Under the Holmes analysis,81 the 
Supreme Court held that the “attenuation” between the section 1962(c) 
violation of not charging the requisite state sales tax and the alleged injury 
of loss of market share was too great to allow recovery under RICO.82 
In 1996, Congress expanded RICO’s statutory definitions of predicate 
acts that constitute indictable “racketeering activity” to include “any act 
which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 
(relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), . . . if . . . committed 
for the purpose of financial gain.”83 Congress added the immigration-
related offenses to RICO’s list of predicate acts “to give [f]ederal law 
enforcement officials additional means with which to combat organized 
immigration crime.”84 Of particular concern to Congress was a noted 
increase in alien smuggling and that because groups “in this country, with 
ties to others abroad . . . [had] developed to prey upon illegal immigrants 
who want to come to the United States.”85 
To date, less than half of the federal courts of appeals have decided 
civil RICO suits predicated on immigration violations. Every case to come 
 
 
 77. Id. at 1997. 
 78. Id. at 1995. 
 79. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2000). 
 80. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1995, 1997. 
 81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 133. 
 83. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 433, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F) (2000)). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F) (2000). The definition fully 
states:  
[A]ny act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating 
to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain 
aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral 
purposes) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose 
of financial gain. 
Id. This Note focuses solely on employers’ violation of section 274 as the alleged predicate offense. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000).  
 84. H.R. Rep. No. 104-22, at 5 (1995). The Committee on the Judiciary “noted with concern the 
development and increase of organized alien smuggling rings. This new form of organized crime preys 
upon those with the most laudable intentions—the desire to make a better life in the United States.” Id. 
at 7. 
 85. 141 CONG. REC. H1588 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. McCollum). 
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before a court of appeals thus far has been brought against employers by 
either business competitors or legally authorized workers.86 The foregoing 
cases decided whether the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a RICO 
enterprise claim to overcome the defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).87 In RICO cases, “[a]t the 
pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [courts] 
presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are 
necessary to support the claim.”88 
D. Civil RICO Suits Predicated on Immigration Offenses 
1. Business Competitors as Plaintiffs 
A civil RICO suit predicated on an immigration offense first reached a 
court of appeals in 2001.89 In Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. 
Colin Service Systems, Inc.,90 Commercial, a small cleaning company, 
brought a putative class-action lawsuit against Colin, a larger business 
competitor. Commercial alleged that Colin was part of an association-in-
fact enterprise,91 and “engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by 
hiring undocumented [workers in violation of section 274].”92 Commercial 
alleged that the “illegal immigrant hiring scheme” enabled Colin to 
underbid its competitors for labor contracts by allowing Colin to pay 
undocumented workers “well below the prevailing wage for [legally 
 
 
 86. See infra Part II.D.1–2; See also Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 
2005), cert. granted sub. nom. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005), cert. 
dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006) and remanded to Williams v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding legally authorized workers had standing to sue under RICO); Trollinger v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding legally authorized workers had standing to 
sue under RICO); Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (dismissing action brought by a 
class of legally authorized workers on the grounds that the employees’ union was a necessary party to 
the lawsuit); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding legally authorized 
workers had standing to sue under RICO); Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 
Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding business competitors had standing to sue under RICO). 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”). 
 88. See Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 256 (1994) (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). 
 89. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1170 (characterizing the Second Circuit in Commercial Cleaning as 
the only circuit to have considered a RICO suit based on the predicate act of violating section 274). 
 90. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 374. 
 91. Id. at 378–79. The complaint asserted that the association-in-fact enterprise was comprised of 
entities that included “employment placement services, labor contractors, newspapers in which Colin 
advertises for laborers, and various immigrant networks that assist fellow illegal immigrants in 
obtaining employment, housing and illegal work permits. Id. at 379. 
 92. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000). 
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authorized workers].93 Commercial claimed that as a result, Colin’s direct 
competitors lost contracts in a “highly competitive price-sensitive 
market.”94 On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the 
district court’s dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).95 The 
district court dismissed for lack of “standing to bring suit because [the 
plaintiff’s] injury did not bear a ‘direct relation’ to [the defendant’s] 
racketeering activity as required by [Holmes].”96 The Second Circuit held 
that the plaintiff indeed had standing to sue under RICO because the small 
company had claimed a direct injury that resulted from the defendant’s 
ability to underbid its competitors on labor contracts to supply cleaning 
services.97 The Second Circuit reasoned that the alleged injury was direct, 
rather than merely derivative of an injury to a third party,98 because “the 
theory of [the plaintiff’s] claim is that [the defendant] undertook the illegal 
immigrant hiring scheme in order to undercut its business rivals.”99 
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Anza, plaintiffs who 
are business competitors may have greater difficulty alleging proximate 
cause because “[a] RICO plaintiff cannot circumvent the proximate cause 
requirement simply by claiming that the defendant’s aim was to increase 
market share at a competitor’s expense.”100 However, Commercial 
Cleaning is distinguishable from Anza, in that the injury was a result of 
head-to-head bidding for labor contracts,101 and unlike in Anza the 
government was not a more direct victim.102 
2. Legally Authorized Workers as Plaintiffs  
Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co.103 is the first in a line of wage-related civil 
RICO suits brought by legally authorized workers alleging that their 
 
 
 93. Id. at 382. 
 94. Id. 
 95. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 96. Id. See infra Part III.C.  
 97. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 384. 
 98. “In a series of cases beginning in the antitrust context and later extended to RICO, the 
Supreme Court clarified that potential plaintiffs who have suffered ‘passed-on’ injury—that is, injury 
derived from a third party’s direct injury—lack statutory standing.” Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 
F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing with approval Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 268 (1992); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 
(1983); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)). 
 99. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 384. 
 100. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., No. 04-433, 126 S. Ct. 1991. 
 101. Compare id. at 1998 with Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 382–83. 
 102. Compare Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1998 with Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 384–85. 
 103. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1163. 
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current or former employer illegally hired undocumented workers in 
violation of section 274. Citing Commercial Cleaning with approval, the 
Ninth Circuit held that a purported class of legally authorized workers had 
standing under RICO to sue their employer, “whom they allege depressed 
their salaries by conspiring to hire undocumented workers at below market 
wages.”104 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knowingly hired 
undocumented workers who were willing to accept below-market wages to 
work in the defendants’ labor-intensive fruit orchards and packing 
houses,105 and alleged an injury to their property in the form of lost 
wages.106 Rejecting the defendant’s argument that in order to allege an 
injury the plaintiffs have to show a “‘property right’ in the lost wages,”107 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that what is required is merely “a legal 
entitlement to business relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the 
RICO predicate statutes.”108 In determining whether the plaintiffs had 
statutory standing the Ninth Circuit applied “three nonexhaustive factors 
in considering causation,”109 based on the Holmes policy justifications.110 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s alleged “scheme aims to 
gain an illegal commercial advantage” in the employer’s relationship with 
the plaintiffs through “disproportionate bargaining power in employment 
contracts.”111 The Ninth Circuit further concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
alleged injury was a “direct injury,” rather than a “passed-on” injury 
caused, both proximately as well as factually, by the employer’s 
scheme.112 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit subsequently dismissed a similar 
employee class action lawsuit. In Baker v. IBP, Inc.,113 the plaintiffs 
 
 
 104. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1166. 
 105. Id. at 1166–67. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1168 n.4 (rejecting employer’s argument that plaintiffs have to show a “property right,” 
by showing either promises or contracts for higher wages, on the grounds that RICO does not 
implicate procedural due process). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1169. The three nonexhaustive causation factors focused on by the Ninth Circuit 
include: 
(1) whether there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongful conduct who can be counted 
on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to ascertain 
the amount of the plaintiff’s damages attributable to defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (3) 
whether the courts will have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate the 
risk of multiple recoveries.  
Id.  
 110. See infra Parts III.C.1–3. 
 111. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1170. 
 112. Id. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 113. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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alleged that their employer was involved in a conspiracy with recruiters 
and a Chinese aid group, and that the alleged enterprise “violated RICO by 
employing undocumented, illegal workers in an effort to drive down 
employee wages.”114 Although the action was ultimately dismissed on the 
grounds that the employees’ union was an indispensable party to the 
lawsuit,115 the Seventh Circuit also noted alternative defects with the 
plaintiffs’ complaint. First, the court observed a failure to satisfy RICO’s 
“enterprise” element under section 1962(c).116 Second, without fully 
deciding the issue, the Seventh Circuit in dicta observed “the difficulty of 
establishing that unlawful hiring of aliens caused a diminution in their 
wages.”117 The Seventh Circuit expressed possible future disagreement 
with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Mendoza that the “injury workers 
suffer when wages are depressed by competition from [undocumented 
workers] is similar to the kind of injuries redressed under the antitrust 
laws.”118 Although reserving resolution of the issue for a future case, the 
Seventh Circuit cautioned that the plaintiffs’ theory that the defendant 
“pays lower wages than some competitors” is an effect that “would be 
very hard to attribute to particular violations of [section 274].”119  
In Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,120 a group of former hourly legally 
authorized workers brought a putative class action lawsuit against their 
 
 
 114. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. 
nom. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006), 
and remanded to Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting conflict 
with the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Baker).  
 115. Baker, 357 F.3d at 690. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the lawsuit “is at its core 
about the adequacy of the wages,” and because the union’s representation “is supposed to be 
‘exclusive’ with respect to wages,” under § 9 of the NLRA the suit could not be permitted to proceed 
without the union as a party. Id. at 690–91.  
 116. Id. at 691–92 (“IBP wants to pay lower wages; the recruiters want to be paid more for 
services rendered (though IBP would like to pay them less); the Chinese Mutual Aid Association 
wants to assist members of its ethnic group. These are divergent goals.”). The Seventh Circuit deemed 
the enterprise element unsatisfied because the “association in fact enterprise” did not share a common 
purpose. But even if an “enterprise” was found to exist, the Baker court also highlighted the fact that 
the defendant neither operated nor managed that enterprise, and without a distinction between the 
defendant and the “enterprise,” RICO is not violated. Id. at 691–92 (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496–97 (1985)). 
 117. Id. at 692. 
 118. Id. The Baker court noted that although “[a]n increased supply of labor logically affects, not 
just the wages at [the defendant’s] plant, but wages throughout the region (if not the country) . . . 
[w]orkers can change employers ([leaving the defendant’s employ] for higher pay elsewhere), and this 
process should cause equilibration throughout the labor market.” Id.  
 119. Id. (posing the following hypothetical for consideration: “[s]uppose that plaintiffs believed 
that [the defendant] has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to calculate other workers’ 
overtime premium; could plaintiffs obtain damages from [the defendant] even though it had paid them 
all that the FLSA requires?”). 
 120. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F.3d 602 (2004). 
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former employer.121 The plaintiffs alleged that their employer “violated 
RICO by engaging in a scheme with several employment agencies to 
depress the wages of [the plaintiffs]” by hiring undocumented workers 
willing to work for far below-market wages.122 The complaint alleged that 
as a result of this scheme, more than half of the employees at a number of 
facilities were undocumented workers, thereby enabling the employer to 
pay its legally authorized workers significantly less than the prevailing 
wage rate amongst other employers of unskilled labor in the surrounding 
areas.123 The district court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)124 
for lack of statutory standing on the grounds that any injury they suffered 
was derivative of an injury to their union.125 The Sixth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of the claim, holding that “this complaint does 
not describe an injury that can be characterized as exclusively 
derivative.”126 
In Williams v. Mohawk Industries,127 current and former hourly 
employees filed a class action suit against their employer, similarly 
alleging that the defendant’s “widespread and knowing employment and 
harboring of illegal workers allowed [it] to reduce labor costs by 
depressing wages for its legal hourly employees . . . in violation of 
[section 1962(c)].”128 According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, “[the 
employer] and third-party temp agencies/recruiters have conspired to 
violate federal immigration laws, destroy documentation, and harbor 
illegal workers.”129 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ complaint 
 
 
 121. Id. at 605. 
 122. Id. at 605–06. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the defendant, along with several 
individuals, conspired to smuggle undocumented workers into the United States and employ them at 
the defendant’s processing plants. Id. at 606. 
 123. Id.  
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 125. Trollinger, at 607. 
 126. Id. at 616. 
 127. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub. nom. 
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005), cert. dismissed, 126 S. Ct. 2016 
(2006), and remanded to Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 1255. 
 129. Id. at 1258. The plaintiffs’ complaint the following: Mohawk employees and recruiters 
routinely traveled to the U.S.-Mexican border to recruit undocumented aliens who have unlawfully 
crossed the border into the United States and transported them to seek employment at the defendant’s 
facilities; Mohawk offered financial incentives to employees and recruiters for finding undocumented 
workers “that Mohawk eventually employs and harbors;” “Mohawk knowingly or recklessly 
accept[ed] fraudulent documentation from the illegal aliens;” and Mohawk “concealed its efforts to 
hire and harbor illegal aliens by destroying documents and helping their undocumented workers in 
evading detection by law enforcement officials.” Id. at 1255. 
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did state a claim under RICO.130 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
the question of “whether plaintiffs state proximately caused injuries to 
business or property by alleging that the hourly wages they voluntarily 
accepted were too low,” but granted certiorari to decide “whether a 
defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an ‘enterprise’ under 
[RICO].”131 In June 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted,132 vacated the judgment, and 
remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration with 
respect to the Court’s opinion in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., decided 
the same day.133  
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit in Mohawk 
Industries134 held that under the facts of the case, the plaintiffs’ complaint 
satisfied the direct relationship requirement set forth in Holmes and Anza 
to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss.135 The Eleventh Circuit 
noted that the complaint sufficiently alleged that “Mohawk’s widespread 
scheme of knowingly hiring and harboring illegal workers has the purpose 
and direct result of depressing the wages paid to the plaintiffs.”136 
 
 
 130. The Eleventh Circuit split with the Seventh Circuit’s stricter requirements for establishing an 
“enterprise” articulated in Baker, because “all that is required is that the enterprise have a common 
purpose.” Id. at 1259. 
[In the Eleventh Circuit,] there has never been any requirement that the ‘common purpose’ of 
the enterprise be the sole purpose of each and every member of the enterprise. In fact, it may 
often be the case that different members of a RICO enterprise will enjoy different benefits 
from the commission of predicate acts. This fact, however, is insufficient to defeat a civil 
RICO claim. 
Id. The limited scope of this Note focuses solely on alleging proximate cause at the pleading stage and 
does not purport to address the enterprise requirement under § 1962(c), which may be an obstacle to 
recovery if a case is permitted to proceed. 
 131. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005) (granting certiorari on 
the sole question of “whether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an ‘enterprise’ 
under [RICO], in light of the settled rule that a RICO defendant must ‘conduct’ or ‘participate in’ the 
affairs of some larger enterprise and not just its own affairs”). Questions Presented, Mohawk Indus., 
Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465, 126 S. Ct. 830 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/ 
05-00465qp.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2006).  
 132. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006). 
 133. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., No. 04-433, 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006) (holding that a 
business competitor cannot maintain civil RICO action against another competitor predicated on 
failure to pay state sales tax due to lack of proximate cause under Holmes analysis). 
 134. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 04-13740, 2006 WL 2742005 (11th Cir. Sept. 27, 2006).  
 135. Id. at *11. 
 136. Id. at 1289. 
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3. Undocumented Workers as Plaintiffs 
The precise question of whether RICO permits undocumented workers 
to bring civil suits against employers, predicated on immigration offenses, 
has yet to reach a court of appeals. Relying on the persuasive authority of 
the foregoing line of cases, undocumented workers recently brought a civil 
RICO suit against their former employer in a federal district court.137 In 
Zavala v. Wal-Mart,138 a putative class of undocumented workers who 
were hired by contractors to work as janitors in various Wal-Mart stores 
brought a RICO enterprise claim against the nation’s largest private 
employer.139 The undocumented workers instigated the lawsuit after 
federal immigration officials coordinated a large-scale raid of Wal-Mart 
stores in October 2003,140 during which most of the Zavala plaintiffs were 
arrested.141 Against this backdrop of facts garnering a large amount of 
attention in the popular media, the Zavala plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart 
formed an association-in-fact enterprise with its maintenance contractors 
for “the purpose of profiting from a systematic violation of immigration 
and labor, wage and hour laws.”142 The district judge dismissed the RICO 
enterprise count without prejudice for failure to demonstrate a factual basis 
for the RICO predicate act, allowing the plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint.143 Specifically, the district court noted that the allegations of 
 
 
 137. See Wal-Mart Janitors, http://www.walmartjanitors.com/wmj94.pl?wsi=0&websys_screen= 
public_casedevelopments (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (site sponsored by attorneys for plaintiffs to 
encourage additional undocumented workers to join the class). 
 138. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 139. Id. at 300 (citing Brief for Defendant at 2, Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 
295 (D.N.J. 2005) (No. 03-5309)). 
 140. Id. As part of the so-called “Operation Rollback,” on October 23, 2003, federal immigration 
officials from the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raided sixty-one Wal-
Mart stores in twenty-one states, arresting a total of 245 undocumented workers, including twelve of 
the named plaintiffs in Zavala, for alleged immigration violations. Charles Toutant, Immigration 
Affidavit Buoys Wal-Mart Suit, 124 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2005). See also Stephanie Armour & Donna 
Leinwand, Wal-Mart Cleaners Arrested in Sweep, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/ 
2003-10-23-walmart-arrests_x.htm (updated Oct. 24, 2003).  
 141. Michael Maiello, It’s not Over for Wal-Mart, FORBES, available at http://www.forbes.com/ 
management/2005/03/18/cz_mm_0318wmt.html (posted Mar. 18, 2005). On March 18, 2005, Wal-
Mart agreed to pay an $11 million civil settlement to the government. In return, federal prosecutors 
agreed not to bring criminal charges against Wal-Mart for years of employing undocumented workers. 
Tom Mars, Wal-Mart’s general counsel, said the money will be used to set up a training program for 
federal agents to discover small companies employing undocumented workers, like the subcontractors 
Wal-Mart had hired to provide janitorial services. Id. Of the Zavala plaintiffs who were arrested, most 
have been granted deferred action status from removal by ICE. Second Amended Complaint at 3-14, 
Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2005 WL 3522044 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2005). 
 142. Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000)).  
 143. Id. at 303.  
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the predicate act of hiring undocumented workers in violation of section 
274(a)(3)(A) was insufficient to state a claim because the plaintiffs failed 
to allege that Wal-Mart had actual knowledge that the undocumented 
workers were brought into the United States in violation of section 
274(a)(3).144  
The undocumented plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended 
complaint, alleging proximate causation in that the “[S]ystematic violation 
of immigration law . . . was the necessary means through which plaintiffs 
were denied proper compensation. . . .”145 The second amended complaint 
did not reassert hiring violation as a predicate act.146  
On August 28, 2006, the district court granted Wal-Mart’s motion to 
dismiss the RICO enterprise claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to 
“plead adequately that the predicate acts of immigration violations . . . 
proximately caused their injuries[.]”147 Analyzing the case under Anza, the 
court reasoned that “the predicate acts of transporting, harboring and 
encouraging aliens are ‘entirely distinct’ from the immediate cause of 
Plaintiffs’ injuries (underpayment of wages)”148 and held that “the path 
from wrongdoing to injury is too indirect to meet the proximate cause 
requirement.”149 Notably, however, the court recognized that “[a] causal 
inference that links hiring of illegal immigrants to wage levels might be 
reasonable and direct . . . .”150  
III. ANALYSIS 
Congress mandates that RICO “be liberally construed to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.”151 However, the Supreme Court has interpreted this to 
mean that a RICO plaintiff only has standing under § 1964(c) by alleging 
 
 
 144. Id. at 308–09. In order to allege section 274(a)(3) as a RICO predicate act, plaintiffs must 
allege that the undocumented workers were “brought into the country by an employer for the purpose 
of illegal employment” and also that the employer had “knowledge of how the [undocumented 
workers] had been brought into the United States” in violation of this employment provision. System 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 91 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (D. Mass. 2000). The court in Loiselle distinguishes 
section 274 from section 274A, which prohibits the “[u]nlawful employment of aliens,” but is not a 
RICO predicate act. Id. at 408–09. 
 145. Second Amended Complaint at 57, Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2005 WL 
3522044 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2005).  
 146. Id.; Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 379, 388 (D.N.J. 2006).  
 147. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d at 389. 
 148. Id. at 387. 
 149. Id. at 386. 
 150. Id. at 388 (distinguishing cases in which “the plaintiffs had alleged that hiring of illegal 
immigrants proximately caused injury by depressing wages”). 
 151. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 
(1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961). 
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“some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct 
alleged;”152 in other words, a RICO plaintiff must claim that “the alleged 
violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”153 Depending on the 
factual circumstances, undocumented workers should have standing to 
pursue employers to recover damages under § 1964(c) by showing a direct 
relationship between the claimed injury of the underpayment of wages and 
the employers’ alleged predicate immigration offense of hiring.154  
A. Employers’ Violation of § 1962(c) 
In Commercial Cleaning, Mendoza, Trollinger, and Williams, the 
courts of appeals permitted the plaintiffs to pursue, beyond the Rule 
12(b)(6) stage, civil RICO actions predicated on the immigration offense 
of knowingly hiring undocumented workers in violation of section 274. 
The Zavala court distinguished the predicate immigration violation of 
hiring from other offenses proscribed by section 274 involving 
transporting, harboring, and encouraging of undocumented workers.155  
Plaintiffs suing employers based on the predicate offense of hiring in 
violation of section 274(a)(3) must sufficiently plead the following two 
elements: (1) that the employer committed the act of knowingly hiring 
undocumented workers, and (2) that the employer had actual knowledge 
that the undocumented workers it hired were brought into the United 
States in violation of section 274.156 Although courts may allow plaintiffs 
to replead their complaint if the section 274(a)(3) claim lacks the second 
element,157 courts appear to require that the employer had knowledge that 
the undocumented workers were brought into the United States “for the 
purpose of illegal employment.”158 
 
 
 152. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). 
 153. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006). 
 154. This analysis proceeds on the assumption that the hypothetical plaintiff class of 
undocumented worker has sufficiently alleged the employer’s substantive violation of § 1962, through 
the conduct of an enterprise in a scheme of knowingly hiring undocumented workers. The following 
section focuses on whether this putative class may sufficiently show proximate cause between the 
section 274 predicate offense and the injury alleged, which is necessary to satisfy the statutory 
standing requirements of § 1964(c).  
 155. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d at 388. 
 156. Sys. Mgmt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 91 F. Supp. 2d 401, 408 (D. Mass. 2000). 
 157. See Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 387 (2d Cir. 
2001); Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295, 316 (D.N.J. 2005).  
 158. Loiselle, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
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B. Injury to Business or Property 
Section 1964(c) requires that RICO plaintiffs show an injury to 
business or property.159 Undocumented workers who have been denied 
federally mandated minimum standards for work already performed suffer 
an injury in the form of wages owed, and under current law they are 
permitted to sue to recover wages.160  
Although the argument was not formally addressed by the court in the 
Zavala opinion, in support of its motion to dismiss, Wal-Mart had argued 
that the undocumented workers lacked RICO standing “because the 
plaintiffs were not harmed by, but in fact benefited from, the alleged 
[immigration offenses].”161 Wal-Mart further argued that the plaintiffs 
voluntarily participated in the alleged RICO offenses, thereby severing the 
alleged “but for” causal chain,162 and asserted the affirmative defense of in 
pari delicto.163 Although the law is unclear as to whether the doctrine is 
available as an affirmative defense to preclude plaintiffs’ claims in the 
RICO context,164 the Supreme Court has held in the antitrust and securities 
law contexts that in pari delicto does not bar recovery when plaintiffs are 
merely passive participants in the violation and are not equally culpable.165 
Courts are unlikely to hold, particularly at the pleading stage, that 
undocumented workers, whose “laudable intentions,”166 have been 
 
 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). 
 160. See supra Part II.B. 
 161. Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 302–03. 
 162. Memorandum of Defendant in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 29–30, Zavala v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2006 WL 381605 (D.N.J. Jan. 20, 2006). 
 163. The in pari delicto doctrine provides that “a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing 
may not recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (8th ed. 
2004). This common law defense derives from the Latin phrase in pari delicto potior est condition 
defendentis, meaning “‘[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . 
is the better one.’” Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306 (1985). The 
policy that the doctrine of in pari delicto advances is that “courts should not lend their good offices to 
mediating disputes among wrongdoers” and “denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is an 
effective means of deterring illegality.” Id. Reply Memorandum of Defendant in Further Support of Its 
Motion to Dismiss at 11–14, Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2006 WL 1732979 (D.N.J. 
May 5, 2006). 
 164. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of PSA, Inc. v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145 (11th Cir. 
2006), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-1335 (U.S. Apr. 14, 2006). Edwards, 437 F.3d at 1156. The court 
barred the plaintiff’s complaint because he was an active participant in the pattern of racketeering 
activity (Ponzi Scheme) and the application of the doctrine furthers the policy of RICO. Id. 
 165. See Bateman Eichler, 472 U.S. at 299 (holding in pari delicto does not bar recovery under 
securities law where plaintiffs were not equally culpable); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts 
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding in pari delicto defense does not apply to the passive involvement 
of antitrust participants who acquiesced to questionable terms of agreements to obtain business). 
 166. See supra note 84. 
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“prey[ed] upon,”167 are equally culpable in an illegal immigrant hiring 
scheme.168 Furthermore, although the participation of undocumented 
workers may help enable an employer’s hiring violation, section 274 itself 
does not impose penalties on undocumented workers. 
C. Direct Relation Between Claimed Injury and Alleged Predicate Offense 
To have standing to sue under section 1964(c), a plaintiff must show 
that the injury was proximately caused by the defendant’s predicate 
offense.169 The Supreme Court in Holmes emphasized the difficulty of 
formulating a bright-line test to govern the result in every case to 
determine whether a plaintiff’s injury is sufficiently “direct” to permit 
standing under civil RICO, due to the “infinite variety of claims that may 
arise.”170 Instead, the Supreme Court articulated several policy 
justifications, borrowed from the antitrust context, for limiting recovery 
only to plaintiffs who allege a direct injury.171 The Holmes proximate 
cause analysis has guided lower federal courts,172 and was recently 
supported by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Anza.  
 
 
 167. See id. and supra note 86. 
 168. In Jane Doe I v. Reddy, 02-05570, 2003 WL 23893010 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003), 
undocumented workers brought suit under civil RICO, predicated on immigration offenses. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants forced them to work without pay. The plaintiffs also alleged that 
the “defendants stole their personal property.” Id. at *2. The defendants in Jane Doe I argued a motion 
to dismiss under the doctrine of in pari delicto. Id. at *6. The defendants argued that “because the 
plaintiffs were complicit in the immigration violations,” they could not recover damages under RICO, 
pointing to the purpose behind RICO of seeing that “innocent parties who are the victims of organized 
crime have a right to obtain proper redress.” Id. (quoting 116 CONG. REC. H35346–47 (Oct. 7, 1970)). 
The district court denied the defendants’ motion, explaining that the court could not at that infant stage 
of litigation determine that the plaintiffs, who according to their complaint “were vulnerable and 
powerless,” were “‘equally’ at fault” for the immigration violations. Id. The court held that the 
“plaintiffs adequately pled an ‘injury to business or property.’” Id. at *2. However, the court declined 
to decide on the merits of the defendants’ argument, and instead left the opportunity to perhaps decide 
that the plaintiffs were in fact equally at fault after further fact-finding. Id. at *6. 
 169. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). See also Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1982) (holding that 
unions lacked standing to sue a contractors’ association for an illegal conspiracy to sue non–union 
subcontractors because the conspiracy would be a direct injury to the union subcontractors, rather than 
the unions); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 724 (1977) (holding that government consumers 
lacked standing to sue based on the theory that high prices were passed on to them as a result of 
defendant’s illegal price-fixing scheme). 
 170. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272, 274 n.20 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536). 
 171. Id. at 269. 
 172. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); Commercial Cleaning 
Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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1. Determining Damages Attributable to the Defendant’s RICO 
Violation  
One policy justification for the direct relationship requirement concerns 
“the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the 
damages caused by some remote action.”173 For undocumented workers 
alleging injury in the form of underpaid minimum wages and overtime 
premiums, a calculation of damages attributable to the scheme to hire 
undocumented workers would be quite simple due to the lack of potential 
intervening factors.  
In Anza, the Supreme Court reasoned that National “could have 
lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to the asserted 
pattern of fraud.”174 The Supreme Court suggested that National “may 
have received a cash flow from some other source or concluded that the 
additional sales would justify a smaller profit margin. Its lowering of 
prices in no sense required it to defraud the state tax authority.”175 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court reasoned that “Ideal’s lost sales could 
have resulted from factors other than [National’s] alleged acts of fraud.176 
The court in Zavala attempted to apply analogous reasoning by asserting 
that “Wal-Mart may have underpaid wages for reasons other than the 
workers’ immigration status, and the workers might have worked for low 
wages for reasons other than their immigration status.”177 Unlike the 
attempt to recover speculative damages allegedly resulting from lost sales 
that could be attributable to a number of business or market factors 
unrelated to the fraud in Anza, the Zavala court could not persuasively 
articulate similar factors that could contribute to the injury in this vastly 
different context. Unlike in Anza, an employer’s underpayment of wages 
to undocumented workers is a purpose and direct result of its illegal hiring 
scheme. Otherwise, it is unlikely that employers would assume the risks of 
illegally hiring undocumented workers. 
However, employers may argue that the injury in the form of wages 
owed was not caused by reason of the hiring of the undocumented workers 
 
 
 173. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., No. 04-443, 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997 (2006) (citing Holmes, 
503 U.S. at 269). 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5309, 2006 WL 2468513, *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2006). 
The Seventh Circuit questioned in dicta whether a depression of wages for legally authorized workers 
would be attributable to an employer’s hiring of undocumented workers, recognizing the possibility of 
intervening factors to interfere with the legally authorized workers receiving higher pay. Baker v. IBP, 
Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2004).  
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per se, but rather by the employer’s violation of the FLSA,178 an offense 
not included among RICO’s exhaustive list of predicate acts.179 The 
Second Circuit rejected an analogous argument in Commercial Cleaning, 
however, reasoning that the intended purpose of the predicate offense, the 
hiring of undocumented workers, is “to take advantage of [the 
undocumented workers’] diminished bargaining position, so as to employ 
a cheaper labor force and compete unfairly on the basis of lower costs.”180 
An employer’s violation of the FLSA, although relevant in determining 
damages, is not the direct cause of the injury, but rather the motivation 
behind the employer’s implementation of the illegal hiring scheme. 
2. Difficulty of Apportioning Damages Among Injured Parties 
Another relevant consideration acknowledges the “appreciable risk of 
duplicative recoveries.”181 However, the direct injury that undocumented 
workers allege would be entirely separate from a likewise direct injury that 
could legally authorized workers or business competitors could allege.182 
Recovery by more than one of the aforementioned plaintiffs would not 
result in the overcompensation of any particular plaintiff, which was the 
Supreme Court’s concern. The Second Circuit in Commercial Cleaning 
correctly stated that “if a defendant’s illegal acts caused direct injury to 
more than one category of plaintiffs, the defendant may well be obligated 
to compensate different plaintiffs for different injuries.”183  
 
 
 178. In a recent case of first impression, a district court held as a matter of law that the FLSA 
preempted the plaintiffs’ RICO claim against an employer for the underpayment of minimum wages 
and overtime pay. Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 2006 WL 2631791 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2006). 
The Choimbol court noted that the plaintiffs’ RICO claim was essentially premised on alleged 
violations of the FLSA and reasoned that but for the proscriptions of the FLSA, the defendant’s 
conduct would not constitute a fraudulent scheme. Id. at *7. Future courts may find persuasive the 
Choimbol plaintiffs’ argument “that RICO is not preempted by the FLSA because it is complimentary 
to and in furtherance of the FLSA.” Id. at *6. Regardless, Choimbol is distinguishable in that the 
alleged RICO predicate acts consisted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, which required 
the proscriptions of the FLSA to make illegal. Id. at *4. On the contrary, violations of section 274 
constitute “racketeering activity” independent of the proscriptions of the FLSA. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(F) (2000). Cf. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 383. The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s alleged injury was caused by low wages paid to defendant’s 
workers, rather than by their immigration status. Id. 
 180. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.3d at 383. 
 181. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., No. 04-443, 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1997–98 (2006) (citing 
Holmes, 503 U.S. 269).  
 182. Legally authorized workers have alleged a similar type of injury in the form of wages, lower 
than the prevailing market wage, but have not alleged receiving wages lower than those required by 
the FLSA. 
 183. Commercial Cleaning, 271 F.2d at 383–84 (“It does not follow that any plaintiff will have 
been twice benefited, which was the concern in Holmes.”). 
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3. Ability of More Direct Parties to Vindicate Aims of the Statute 
Finally, “[t]he requirement of a direct causal connection is especially 
warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can 
be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims.”184 In 
Anza, the Supreme Court concluded that the direct victim of National’s 
fraud was the State.185 Undocumented workers are the proper plaintiffs to 
seek recovery for the underpayment of wages; indeed, no other party could 
seek recovery for such injury.186 
The Ninth Circuit in Mendoza granted deference to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Hoffman Plastic by incorporating it as a “factor” in its 
analysis to determine whether undocumented workers could bring civil 
RICO suits against employers, although nevertheless correctly recognizing 
that, with regard to this particular issue, Hoffman Plastic is not 
dispositive.187 However, by expressly heeding the Supreme Court’s 
example in Hoffman Plastic, the Ninth Circuit thereafter concluded “that 
the undocumented workers cannot ‘be counted on to bring suit for the 
law’s vindication.’”188 The Ninth Circuit justified its holding that the 
Mendoza plaintiffs, legally authorized workers, had standing to sue 
employers under civil RICO by reasoning that “the fact that RICO 
specifically provides that illegal hiring is a predicate offense indicates that 
Congress contemplated the enforcement of the immigration laws through 
lawsuits like this one.”189 
The Ninth Circuit was misguided in concluding that undocumented 
workers cannot be “counted on to bring suit” against employers based on 
predicate acts of immigration offenses.190 However, the ability of 
undocumented workers to bring suit should not preclude other victims 
 
 
 184. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1998 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70); see also Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
270 (citing Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 545) (“[T]he existence of an identifiable class of 
persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in [RICO] 
enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party . . . to perform the office of 
a private attorney general.”). 
 185. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1998. 
 186. As the Seventh Circuit previously observed, no other parties would be entitled to recover 
damages for an employer’s failure to pay statutorily-mandated minimum wages and overtime 
premiums, other than the worker who was injured by such violation. Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 
692 (7th Cir. 2004). See supra note 121. 
 187. Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2002). See supra Part II.B. 
 188. Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1170 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 273).  
 189. Id. 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
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from also bringing suit based on the same predicate acts if they are able to 
allege a sufficiently direct injury.191  
IV. PROPOSAL 
Granting undocumented workers standing to sue employers under civil 
RICO will likely have an increased deterrent effect on employers who 
routinely hire undocumented workers who have been brought into the 
United States in violation of federal immigration law. Congress’s 
inclusion of section 274, but not section 274A, within RICO’s 1996 
amended definitions indicates that the expansion of this enforcement tool 
is targeted at the most egregious offenders. Claims under civil RICO 
would also target employers who have conspired with labor subcontractors 
and other groups to circumvent the proscriptions of section 274A. 
Extending to undocumented workers the right to sue under RICO will lead 
to increased private enforcement of immigration law as employers are 
confronted with the potential liability of paying treble damages in class 
action lawsuits. A reduction in the prospects for financial gain from hiring 
undocumented workers will likely result in a lessened demand for 
undocumented labor in the United States and will further the longstanding 
congressional policy of preserving jobs for American workers. 
Undocumented workers should be permitted to recover from employers 
under civil RICO, not instead of but in addition to other direct victims, 
because one injury is not merely derivative of the other. Under factual 
circumstances similar to those in Williams, undocumented workers could 
sufficiently allege proximate cause to bring a civil RICO action against 
employers, predicated on the section 274 illegal hiring offense. Although 
Williams recognized that the employer’s predicate acts had the purpose 
and direct result of depressing the wages paid to legally authorized 
workers, the broader purpose of the illegal hiring scheme was to reduce 
labor costs. By those terms, the scheme directly resulted in injury to both 
legally authorized and undocumented workers. 
But, given the substantial disincentives for undocumented workers to 
reveal their illegal status by bringing suit,192 the currently underutilized 
 
 
 191. See supra Part IV.C. 
 192. Among the disincentives that undocumented workers face are the fear of being fired, 
blacklisted, or ultimately ordered removed. Other crucial factors also prevent undocumented workers 
from bringing suit in court, including language barriers, lack of understanding of the law, and lack of 
access to legal aid. But cf. JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT 
RIGHTS (2005) (recounting her experience with the Workplace Project, an immigrant workers’ center 
on Long Island, New York, involving the legal activism of undocumented workers in campaigning to 
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option the FLSA provides for civil actions,193 and the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in Zavala, it may be unlikely that future civil RICO 
actions will be brought against employers by undocumented workers. 
However, as seen in Zavala, undocumented workers may sometimes 
bring suit regardless of the potential negative consequences. Although 
most of the Zavala plaintiffs had been granted deferred action status, 
perhaps the most willing plaintiffs may be undocumented residents against 
whom deportation proceedings have been initiated.194 Undocumented 
workers who could allege sufficient proximate cause under Anza to 
withstand the employer’s motion to dismiss would likely be the most 
deserving victims of an illegal hiring scheme and would likely have the 
least to risk by bringing suit.  
Federal courts should grant undocumented workers standing, not only 
to have their injuries vindicated, but also because as a policy reason it 
would likely facilitate future compliance with immigration law. Should 
this issue reach the Supreme Court, the Court should use the opportunity 
to limit its holding in Hoffman Plastic by distinguishing between backpay 
for work that would have been performed versus recovery for work 
already performed. The Supreme Court should uphold the right of 
undocumented workers to sue to recover unpaid wages in accordance with 
principles of international law, the DOL’s agency interpretation, and the 
federal courts that have permitted undocumented workers to recover 
wages for work performed post-Hoffman Plastic.195 
 
 
recoup unpaid wages and for safe working conditions); Bosniak, supra note 26, at 997 (arguing that 
some undocumented workers are more concerned with losing their jobs and intend to return to the 
United States shortly if ordered removed). 
 193. The remedy for treble damages that RICO accords offers a greater economic incentive for 
undocumented workers to bring suit against employers than does the lower remedy recoverable under 
the FLSA. Also, RICO class actions are brought under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, whereas class actions under the FLSA have an opt-in, rather than opt-out, mechanism for 
joining the class, which will more likely favor a transient workforce. Granting undocumented workers 
standing to sue likely would encourage employers to reach out-of-court settlements with the plaintiffs 
to avoid paying treble damages as well as costs of litigation and attorneys’ fees. See Maiello, supra 
note 141. “That leaves Wal-Mart in a bit of dilemma. They’ll be under some amount of pressure to do 
the right thing and settle with the people, because they don’t like being called racketeers.” Id. (quoting 
plaintiffs’ attorney in Zavala).  
 194. See U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2003, 
http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/YrBk03En.htm. 
 195. See supra Part II.B. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Congress’s expansion of the RICO Act’s list of predicate offenses to 
include certain immigration violations, relating to the hiring of 
undocumented workers, demonstrates a continued commitment—a decade 
after the enactment of IRCA—to reducing employment opportunities for 
undocumented workers as a primary method for curbing illegal 
immigration. Moreover, it reflects the broader longstanding congressional 
commitment to the protection of American workers through a restrictive 
immigration policy, a goal which will be furthered by granting 
undocumented workers standing to bring suit against employers under 
civil RICO.196  
The foregoing line of civil RICO immigration cases, which encourage 
collective action, has created an opening for “private attorneys general” to 
supplant weak government enforcement of federal immigration law. 
Extending this private cause of action to undocumented workers will force 
employers to consider ex ante the potential liability of paying treble 
damages in a class action lawsuit in its cost-benefit calculus of whether to 
knowingly hire undocumented workers at terms that are in noncompliance 
with minimum wage and overtime pay requirements.197 By directly 
combating the employment stimulus commonly accorded with eliciting 
illegal immigration, civil RICO offers a potentially potent weapon for 
curtailing a problem which thus far has remained unabated. 
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